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Scanning iPhones to Save Children:
Apple’s On-Device Hashing Algorithm
Should Survive a Fourth Amendment
Challenge
Timothy Gernand*
ABSTRACT
When Apple announced it would combat the growth of child
sexual abuse material (CSAM) on its platform by scanning all its
users’ devices without their consent, many of its loyal customers
felt betrayed. With tech companies such as Google and Facebook
arranging their business models around selling their customers’
personal information, Apple customers saw the company’s focus
on privacy as a refreshing alternative. However, as Apple itself
privately acknowledged, this emphasis on privacy had led to it
becoming a haven for CSAM. Despite the reputational damage it
would incur with its customers, Apple resolved to confront
CSAM on its platform in an unprecedented manner. Until Apple’s announcement, no major tech company had resolved to install a hashing algorithm directly onto its devices to search for
CSAM.
Apple’s move places itself in the middle of a legal firestorm
with the protections of the Fourth Amendment squaring off
against the public demand to eradicate CSAM and protect the
nation’s children from abuse. In deciding CSAM cases, courts
have often focused on the application of the private search doctrine. Tech companies implementing anti-CSAM hashing protocols have sometimes run afoul of this doctrine and other aspects
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
This Comment argues that Apple’s move not only complies
with the constitutional standards expressed by circuit courts but
exceeds those standards. In addition, a strong public policy justification exists for Apple’s initiative. Congress has repeatedly expressed its intent to combat CSAM and protect children from
sexual abuse, and by complying with this congressional intent,
* J.D. Candidate, Penn State Dickinson Law, 2023. I dedicate this Comment to my
wife Kate for her ardent support and steadfast encouragement.
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Apple aligns with public policy. Finally, this Comment recommends that the U.S. Supreme Court resolve the circuit split regarding Fourth Amendment-implicated CSAM cases by adopting
a new rule.
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INTRODUCTION
Do ye hear the children weeping, O my brothers,
Ere the sorrow comes with years?
They are leaning their young heads against their mothers, —
And that cannot stop their tears.
The young lambs are bleating in the meadows;
The young birds are chirping in the nest;
The young fawns are playing with the shadows;
The young flowers are blowing toward the west—
But the young, young children, O my brothers,
They are weeping bitterly!
They are weeping in the playtime of the others,
In the country of the free.1

Child sexual abuse material (CSAM) is a worldwide scourge.2
Historically, CSAM’s impact was minimal, but the internet caused
an explosion in supply and demand for this repulsive material.3
Governments have struggled to respond effectively to the CSAM
epidemic.4 Faced with governments’ lack of capability, private actors—including technology companies—have attempted to arrest
1. ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING, THE CRY OF THE CHILDREN (1844), reprinted in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING 128
(Wordsworth Poetry Library 2015).
2. This Comment refers to “child sexual abuse material” (CSAM) because
there is a broad movement away from the term “child pornography,” as it is believed that the term “child pornography” connotes mere erotica, where CSAM
emphasizes the exploitation involved in the crime’s production. Michael Salter &
Tyson Whitten, A Comparative Content Analysis of Pre-Internet and Contemporary
Child Sexual Abuse Material, 43 DEVIANT BEHAV. 1, 1 n.1 (2021). CSAM is a
“global child protection challenge and priority,” with the United States reporting
CSAM increasing at a rate of 50 percent per year. Id. at 1.
3. See Larissa S. Christensen et al., The Theory and Evidence Behind Law
Enforcement Strategies That Combat Child Sexual Abuse Material, 23 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 392, 393 (2021) (reporting that Australia, for example, catalogued an 80 percent increase in CSAM reports between 2017 and 2018).
4. Id.

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\127-1\DIK108.txt

310

unknown

Seq: 4

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

25-OCT-22

11:22

[Vol. 127:307

the unprecedented growth of CSAM.5 For example, Google and
Facebook have played a key role in innovating anti-CSAM efforts.6
Apple, however, distinguished itself among the tech giants as
the only large technology company that effectively championed privacy.7 Although a highly successful marketing strategy, Apple’s unqualified focus on privacy damaged its ability to confront CSAM on
its platforms.8 Belatedly recognizing that it had become a haven for
child predators, Apple announced in 2021 that it would install a
hashing algorithm to search for CSAM on all its devices.9 After detecting CSAM, the images would be subject to human review
before being referred to law enforcement.10
Apple’s announcement revealed two things: (1) Apple was
now willing to not only confront CSAM on its platform but to leapfrog its competitors by attacking CSAM in an unprecedented way,
and (2) Apple would face significant criticism for abandoning its
emphasis on privacy by degrading its users’ device security.11 Beyond these immediate revelations lies an important legal question:
may a technology company scan its users’ devices for CSAM without violating the U.S. Constitution?
The answer to that question requires a thorough analysis of the
history of CSAM, the battle against it, and an analysis of the legal
doctrines at play. The fallout from Apple’s move has the potential
5. MaryJane Gurriell, Born into Porn But Rescued by Thorn: The Demand for
Tech Companies to Scan and Search for Child Sexual Abuse Images, 59 FAM. CT.
REV. 840, 841–42, 845 (2021) (describing the inability of government officials to
arrest the growth of CSAM absent cooperation from tech companies, and the great
success some companies have had in attacking CSAM on their platforms, including
Facebook, Google, and Microsoft).
6. Id. at 845.
7. See Kif Leswing, Apple Is Turning Privacy into a Business Advantage, Not
Just a Marketing Slogan, CNBC (June 7, 2021, 6:52 PM), https://cnb.cx/31h70SQ
[https://perma.cc/WUP2-QK2N] (reporting Apple’s privacy push since 2014).
8. See Sean Hollister, Sweetheart Deals and Plastic Knives: All the Best Emails
from the Apple vs. Epic Trial, VERGE (Aug. 19, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://bit.ly/
3B36kfG [https://perma.cc/Q5X7-HGNR] (providing via Number 71 an exchange
between Apple executives in which one stated that Apple’s weakness on CSAM
was attributable to its strength on privacy).
9. Jon Porter, Apple Scrubs Controversial CSAM Detection Feature from
Webpage but Says Plans Haven’t Changed, VERGE (Dec. 15, 2021, 11:56 AM),
https://bit.ly/34zufsL [https://perma.cc/H4S9-8HRB] (reporting that despite Apple
scrubbing mention of its CSAM detection feature from its Child Safety webpage,
Apple still plans to release the feature it first announced in August 2021).
10. See also APPLE, EXPANDED PROTECTIONS FOR CHILDREN FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 5–6 (2021), https://apple.co/32FBf6A [https://perma.cc/6HHF5EZ5] (stating that Apple will always conduct human review of flagged images
before reporting to authorities).
11. See Lim, infra note 71; see also McKinney & Portnoy, infra note 75.
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to impact Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a significant way.12
This Comment intends to illuminate a topic of grave importance to
children, parents, Apple users, criminal defendants, and the legal
community.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of CSAM
1. Historical Background
The introduction of—and widespread access to—the internet
has undeniable benefits for society. While writing letters was a favored way of communicating with loved ones in the past, the rise of
technology applications like Facebook and Snapchat has made
keeping in touch easier than ever before. Home chefs who in the
past relied on passed-down recipes or borrowed recipe books can
now quickly access a virtually limitless trove of meal ideas on
Pinterest. While just two generations ago students researching a paper trudged to a library to acquire sources, today, they can access
peer-reviewed journal articles and entire books from their
smartphones.
Access to the internet has profoundly and likely irreversibly
changed society, but not all this increased access to information has
been positive. Fraudsters can now easily gain access to unwitting
victims through phishing scams and exploitative emails.13 Those involved with organized crime have been able to peddle their illicit
wares more clandestinely via the virtually unregulated Darknet.14
And, perhaps most devastating of all, the internet has allowed
predators to quickly and easily acquire and distribute CSAM.15
12. See Lim, infra note 71. This inference arises from the combination of Apple’s unique anti-CSAM initiative and the “growing tension in the circuits” over
CSAM-related legal issues. See id. (illustrating the unique nature of Apple’s
NeuralHash algorithm); United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2021).
13. See, e.g., Zainab Alkhalil et al., Phishing Attacks: A Recent Comprehensive Study and a New Anatomy, 3 FRONTIERS COMPUT. SCI. 1, 1 (2021) (defining
phishing as “a highly effective form of cybercrime that enables criminals to deceive
users and steal important data”).
14. See Mihnea Mirea et al., The Not So Dark Side of the Darknet: A Qualitative Study, 32 SEC. J. 102, 103 (2019) (characterizing the Darknet as an illegal drug
haven and source of identity theft schemes).
15. See Diane Jennings, Fight Against Child Pornography an Uphill Battle in
the Internet Age, DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 28, 2013), https://bit.ly/3EdizYW
[https://perma.cc/5S7E-CSRD] (reporting that while CSAM had been mostly eradicated in the 1980s, the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children now
receives 10,000 CSAM tips per week and 91 million CSAM images have been
seized by authorities since 2002, but in contrast, only 5,000 people were arrested
for CSAM-related crimes in 2009).
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Prior to the advent of the internet, would-be CSAM viewers
were unable to organize in any meaningful way because it was difficult to find access to the desired resources anonymously.16 A child
predator could not simply ask a Blockbuster associate their recommendations for an illegal pornographic video of prepubescent children or invite their neighbors for a CSAM viewing party without
quickly gaining unwanted attention from law enforcement.17 Small
groups of like-minded deviants certainly existed, but their ability to
readily access their desired materials was limited.18 In fact, prior to
the ubiquity of internet access, CSAM was not regarded as a significant problem by academics.19 While some producers of child pornography in the 1970s distributed their sexually explicit materials
via the mail system, by the 1980s, law enforcement considered widespread sexually explicit material virtually eradicated.20
2. The Tech Boom
When internet access exploded in the late 1990s and early
2000s, the amount of CSAM available increased proportionately.21
The ability to share and receive illicit pornographic content quickly,
easily, and relatively anonymously via the internet led to significant
increases in the volume of child-focused sexual content in the past
two decades.22 Between 1998 and 2018, the number of reported
images of CSAM increased more than 613,233 percent.23 A 2021
study by the U.S. Sentencing Commission revealed even more
troubling statistics about the nature of this content.24 In 2019, more
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Salter & Whitten, supra note 2, at 1–3 (describing the skepticism of
academics toward CSAM and its negative effects on society until the digital evidence of CSAM provided by the internet undermined skeptics’ positions).
20. Id.
21. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (2020), https://bit.ly/3nrNppU
[https://perma.cc/N7DE-X6Q9] (last visited Oct. 30, 2021) (describing the parallel
between the rise of the internet and the rise of CSAM, and preferring the terms
“child sexual exploitation” and “child sexual abuse” to the legacy term “child pornography” because the term “child pornography” does not adequately capture the
extent of damage inflicted on children).
22. See id.
23. See Michael H. Keller & Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Internet Is Overrun with
Images of Child Sexual Abuse. What Went Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/3pvQyaW [https://perma.cc/P4L6-VRXE] (tracking the progression
of reported CSAM from 3,000 reports in 1998 to 18.4 million in 2018, with the 2018
reports including a total of 45 million CSAM images).
24. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: NON-PRODUCTION OFFENSES 1–3 (2021), https://bit.ly/3jxRubc [https://
perma.cc/D5VR-XUMA].
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than 50 percent of the millions of illicit images discovered from
CSAM-related investigations featured toddlers and infants.25 The
FBI also disclosed that in 2019 there were numerous sites on the
Darknet devoted exclusively to sexualized images of very young
children.26 One such site generated more than 150,000 unique users
within 2 months of it being operational.27 These statistics point to a
horrific scale of child abuse that would have been difficult to imagine from the standpoint of CSAM’s nadir in the 1980s.
B. The Battle Against CSAM
1. The Government Outmatched
Law enforcement agencies have attempted to identify and
charge CSAM perpetrators but, despite some successes in prosecuting larger networks of CSAM consumers and distributors, combatting CSAM access in a meaningful way has proven difficult.28
Despite having entire teams of law enforcement personnel in dozens of countries working exclusively on child exploitation-related
crimes and investing billions of dollars on this issue, the number of
CSAM images has substantially increased.29 As CSAM images proliferate, law enforcement agencies have struggled to disrupt the
more organized and covert pedophile networks.30 Some of these
groups even provide guides on how to avoid law enforcement attention by using specific encryption techniques, coded language, and
sharing files via less traditional fora like online gaming platforms.31
2. The Public Takes Action
Given the unique vulnerability of children and the lifelong negative effects of their sexual exploitation, the public has a significant
25. Id. at 4.
26. See FBI Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2020: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Just., Sci. & Related Agencies of the H. Appropriations Comm.,
116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation), https://bit.ly/3pwKbUV [https://perma.cc/WXS5-ZVTW].
27. Id.
28. See Patrick Smith & Carlo Angerer, Dark Web Child Abuse Image Site
with 400,000 Members Taken Down in Global Police Sting, NBC NEWS (May 3,
2021, 10:08 AM), https://nbcnews.to/3Gfg0rb [https://perma.cc/N3KG-UDXA]
(portraying dark web CSAM communities as demonstrating “resilience” to law
enforcement operations).
29. See Keller & Dance, supra note 23.
30. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 21 (representing that CSAM is available through “virtually every Internet technology” and that offenders use “increasingly sophisticated” methods to evade law enforcement).
31. Id.
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interest in ensuring their protection.32 Finding the children used in
pornographic content is considered particularly critical as sexualized images are often not the only abuse these children suffer.33 In
fact, there is a well-established connection between CSAM and
broader sexual violence.34
The inability of law enforcement agencies to significantly hamper CSAM has prompted a variety of concerned stakeholders to
become more involved in combatting this particularly vile form of
criminality.35 In the United States, the group Perverted Justice
gained widespread attention for their involvement in the Dateline
“To Catch a Predator” series, while Canadian civilians created a
similar group called Creep Catchers.36
Private companies, particularly those directly involved with the
internet, have also implemented policies designed to reduce child
exploitation-related offenses.37 Popular social media platforms like
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter provide users with options to report sexually explicit content directly to moderators.38
Unfortunately, because the COVID-19 pandemic led to children spending more time at home, reports of pornographic images
of minors more than doubled, leaving the platforms unable to meet
32. Ateret Gewirtz-Meydan et al., The Complex Experience of Child Pornography Survivors, 80 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 238, 242–43 (2018) (indicating that
nearly half of adult survivors of child pornography experienced guilt, shame, ongoing vulnerability, and fear they would be recognized due to the images’ widespread
distribution).
33. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 21 (reporting an increase in images
depicting sadistic and violent child sexual abuse).
34. See Candice Kim, From Fantasy to Reality: The Link Between Viewing
Child Pornography and Molesting Children, AM. PROSECUTORS RSCH. INST.,
NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 1 (2004), https://bit.ly/2Zx4zua
[https://perma.cc/J7EP-QTD7] (reporting that a substantial number of arrested
child pornographers were confirmed child molesters and that a majority of CSAMrelated offenders admitted to physical sex crimes).
35. See Brend, infra note 36; see also Solon, infra note 37.
36. Yvette Brend, Perverting Justice? Privacy Ruling Won’t Stop Vigilantes
‘Addicted’ to On-Camera Stings, CBC NEWS (July 29, 2017), https://bit.ly/3jPjDKS
[https://perma.cc/3ZPP-BZHA] (reporting that despite a ruling against the British
Columbia-based Creep Catchers, the group intended to continue preventative efforts to stop CSAM).
37. Olivia Solon, Child Sexual Abuse Images and Online Exploitation Surge
During Pandemic, NBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2020, 3:01 PM), https://nbcnews.to/
3nFeJkV [https://perma.cc/623J-FWTR] (reporting that Zoom now defaults to
password protection for meetings because of CSAM reports, that many other technology companies have zero-tolerance policies for CSAM, and that locating and
removing such content is a top priority).
38. Id. (indicating that technology companies have automated systems in
place to target CSAM but these systems are inadequate, forcing these companies
to rely heavily on user reports to identify and remove CSAM).
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the demand for increased scrutiny.39 Some strategies undertaken by
these businesses have proven more successful than others. For example, when Google and Bing implemented warnings that searches
for CSAM were illegal and recommended that the searcher seek
help, one study found a 67 percent decrease in the number of
CSAM searches in the United States.40 This statistic demonstrates
how warnings may play a significant role in deterring potential
CSAM viewers from seeking illicit content and may provide a justification for other powerful technology companies to utilize similar
practices.
3. The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children
The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children
(NCMEC) is a nonprofit organization that plays a key role in Big
Tech anti-CSAM efforts.41 In 1984, John and Revé Walsh founded
NCMEC in response to the tragic kidnapping and murder of their
six-year-old son, Adam.42 John and Revé Walsh’s purpose in founding NCMEC was to improve the disorganized, fragmented, and ultimately ineffective law enforcement response they witnessed during
their son’s disappearance.43 Over time, NCMEC evolved into the
premier nonprofit organization dealing with missing and exploited
children’s issues.44 Today, NCMEC employs over 340 people who
work to prevent child exploitation and to help find missing
children.45
NCMEC is not merely a nonprofit organization with substantial credibility in the CSAM space.46 Instead, it is an organization
39. Id.
40. Thanh Ly et al., Understanding Online Child Sexual Exploitation Offenses,
18 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPS. 74, 74 (2016).
41. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ABOUT
US, https://bit.ly/3psEJCz [https://perma.cc/K4RP-J2UU] (last visited Oct. 30,
2021) [hereinafter NCMEC]; see also NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 2020 REPORTS BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE PROVIDERS (ESP)
(2021), https://bit.ly/3zqkvxC [https://perma.cc/5BR6-5RX9] [hereinafter NCMEC
REPORTS] (describing how dozens of ESPs use NCMEC to report CSAM on their
platforms).
42. See The EARN IT Act: Holding the Tech Industry Accountable in the Fight
Against Online Child Sexual Exploitation: Hearing on S. 3398 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2020) (statement of John Shehan, Vice President,
National Center for Missing & Exploited Children), https://bit.ly/3jr3tHh [https://
perma.cc/9QLR-5AYB].
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b) (providing for an annual grant of federal funds
to NCMEC to operate reporting services for CSAM and other activities); see also
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that the U.S. Congress chose to both receive federal funding and
play a principal role in the federal government’s anti-CSAM campaign.47 Showcasing the power that Congress invested in NCMEC
(and perhaps also its quasi-deputization as a law enforcement entity), service providers that fail to report CSAM on their platforms
to NCMEC violate federal law.48 However, service providers are
not required to search for CSAM on their platforms; the duty to
report is only triggered if and when service providers discover
CSAM.49
NCMEC maintains the CyberTipline, a centralized reporting
system for online CSAM that received 21.7 million reports in 2020
from dozens of Electronic Service Providers (“ESPs”).50 It is worth
noting, of those 21.7 million reports, approximately 20.3 million
originated from Facebook, while only 265 originated from Apple.51
This massive disparity between reports from the two companies is
almost certainly a result of underreporting by Apple due to its technical inability, or refusal, to confront CSAM on its platform, rather
than an actual indication of the difference in CSAM prevalence on
the two platforms.52 For years, Facebook has actively scanned every
photo uploaded to its platform for CSAM, while Apple, despite
having the capacity to do the same, has—until recently—refrained
from doing so.53 Presumably, Apple’s reports to NCMEC are limited because it only began to scan its iCloud Mail service in 2019,

18 U.S.C. § 2258A (providing that ESPs have a duty to report CSAM on their
platforms to NCMEC).
47. See 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1)(A).
49. See id.
50. NCMEC REPORTS, supra note 41.
51. Id.
52. Compare Antigone Davis, New Technology to Fight Child Exploitation,
FACEBOOK (Oct. 24, 2018), https://bit.ly/30U23yS [https://perma.cc/LGA8-KZH7]
(describing that in 2018, Facebook had already been using photo-matching technology “for years” to detect and report CSAM on its platform, and that it was
currently upgrading to machine learning technologies to be able to not only detect
CSAM at the time of upload but to predict which accounts would upload CSAM),
and FACEBOOK TRANSPARENCY CENTER, POLICY ON CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, https://bit.ly/3nmLFOT [https://perma.cc/6WM7-TRRE] (last visited Oct. 23,
2021) (describing Facebook’s practice of removing even well-intentioned nude pictures of children posted by parents), with Ben Lovejoy, Apple Already Scans
iCloud Mail for CSAM, but Not iCloud Photos, 9TO5MAC (Aug. 23, 2021, 4:43
AM), https://bit.ly/2ZqT5bP [https://perma.cc/BET2-YYUM] (reporting that Apple began scanning iCloud Mail for CSAM in 2019, but did not scan iCloud Photos
despite iCloud Photos’ lack of encryption and Apple’s ability to scan).
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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and its planned expansion of CSAM detection on iCloud Photos
will result in a massive increase in reports to the CyberTipline.54
C. Anti-CSAM Efforts
1. Historical Background
Early efforts to address the online CSAM problem faced two
primary obstacles: legal roadblocks and technological deficiencies.55
Governments were confounded by legal issues such as determining
whether an act constituted “child pornography” and whether an apparent minor was old enough to trigger a relevant legal provision.56
Police struggled to deal with even rudimentary forms of encryption
such as encrypted emails and internet protocol (“IP”) masking,
which prevented police from geolocating a CSAM suspect.57
A Facebook-integrated application developed by a United
Kingdom government agency and implemented in 2010 both exemplified an early form of technology that could succeed against
CSAM and presaged the future role of public-private partnerships
in combatting CSAM.58 The application provided users a simple
way to report CSAM or attempts to groom children, and within a
month of introduction resulted in 211 reports, many of which could
result in serious criminal charges.59 While somewhat effective, this
technology has limited use in combatting CSAM on a wide scale
because it is simply impossible for human-initiated reports to ever
amount to more than a tiny fraction of the tens of millions of
CSAM images transmitted annually.60
54. See NCMEC REPORTS, supra note 41. The inference that Apple’s new
tools will lead to a large increase in reports to NCMEC arises from comparing
Facebook’s 20.3 million reports to the CyberTipline in 2020, Google’s 546,704 reports, and Amazon’s 2,235 reports, with Apple’s paltry 265 reports, despite Apple
holding 52 percent of the smartphone user market in the United States. Id.; see
also STATISTA, SUBSCRIBER SHARE HELD BY SMARTPHONE OPERATING SYSTEMS
IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 2012 TO 2021 (2021), https://bit.ly/3ptpR6L [https://
perma.cc/Z6FB-DD92] (reporting Apple’s share of the smartphone user market
rose from 29.5 percent in January 2012 to 52 percent in May 2021).
55. See Anne Burke et al., Child Pornography and the Internet: Policing and
Treatment Issues, 9 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH. & L. 79, 80 (2002).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Mark Sweney, Facebook ClickCeop App to Offer Optional ‘Panic Button,’ GUARDIAN (July 12, 2010, 2:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3Ewxm1i [https://perma.cc/
CN9H-TVWU].
59. See Jemima Kiss, Facebook Child Protection App Prompts 211 Reports of
Suspicious Online Activity, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2010, 11:26 AM), https://bit.ly/
3bo3Z4r [https://perma.cc/XY7R-HLNU].
60. See Keller & Dance, supra note 23.
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2. Hashing
As online CSAM has grown exponentially from its early days,
new technologies have formed to combat the surge of illegal material. One such technology is hashing.61 A hash value is a set of characters generated by a mathematical algorithm and derived from an
image that allows computer programs to quickly scan the content of
many images by simply reading the set of characters.62 Hashing refers to the technique of generating these hash values and using
them to analyze media data.63
Hashing has become the preferred anti-CSAM technique of
technology companies and law enforcement because it allows for
the rapid scanning of large volumes of images and for the verification that an apparent copy of an image is in fact an exact copy of
the original image.64 For example, instead of requiring the computing power necessary to scan and compare a relatively large image
file of purported CSAM to an image file of known CSAM, hashing
allows for the comparison of two relatively small strings of characters. By reducing the size of the scanned files, hashing results in
more efficient computer processing of suspect images.65 Perhaps
more importantly, using hashing to search for CSAM does not require human input.66 Removing the human element during the
search is critical for efficient processing for CSAM searches; however, it is just as critical to retain the human element after the search
to meet the legal standard of the private search doctrine.67

61. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing
Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 38–40 (2005)).
62. See Salgado, supra note 61, at 38–40.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 40 (describing how hashing can automate the previously massive
analytical task of comparing large numbers of images).
66. Id.
67. Companies should retain the human element after an automated search is
completed because although some circuit courts have found hashing’s discovery of
CSAM to be equivalent to a human’s discovery of CSAM, other circuit courts have
rejected this equivalency and insist on a human to satisfy the private search exception. See United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 978 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing the
Ninth Circuit’s differing interpretation of the private search doctrine with the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits and noting that “no human had viewed Wilson’s images
before”).
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D. Apple’s Anti-CSAM Move
1. Apple’s Announcement
In August 2021, Apple announced its intention to prevent the
spread of CSAM via a software update that would: (1) apply new
forms of cryptography, (2) provide new communication tools, and
(3) update its Siri and Search tools.68 The relatively innocuous and
uncontroversial second and third parts of Apple’s plan do not implicate any legal doctrine, and this Comment will not address
them.69 However, Apple’s announced new forms of cryptography
involve the unprecedented installation of CSAM hashes onto every
Apple device with the aim of scanning every photo uploaded to
iCloud for matches to known CSAM hashes.70 While other technology companies have used hashing for years to disrupt CSAM on
their platforms by scanning emails and cloud data, no major technology company has yet admitted to a plan to install anti-CSAM
hashing technology directly onto users’ devices.71
Apple apparently recognized, likely due to its failure to confront CSAM on its platform relative to the efforts made by Big
Tech competitors such as Facebook and Google, that it had become
a favored platform for distributing CSAM.72 Apple’s own antifraud chief, Eric Friedman, stated in a private conversation that
68. See APPLE, EXPANDED PROTECTIONS FOR CHILDREN, https://bit.ly/
3IRF1K0 [https://perma.cc/GW5N-NRJ4] (last visited Mar. 6, 2022) (displaying the
page as it existed on October 25, 2021, before it was updated to remove mention of
Apple’s CSAM detection tools); see also Joanna Stern, Apple’s Child-Protection
Features and the Question of Who Controls Our Smartphones, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
13, 2021, 12:44 PM), https://on.wsj.com/3CLq8pt [https://perma.cc/J3YL-S774].
69. See APPLE, supra note 68. Apple’s “new communication tools” refer to
updates to iMessage that include blurring sexually explicit photos and notifying
parents when children send or receive such photos, and the Siri and Search updates involve warnings when users search for CSAM, like those warnings used by
Google and Bing and discussed in note 22. Id.; see also Ly, supra note 40.
70. See APPLE, CSAM DETECTION: TECHNICAL SUMMARY 4 (2021), https://
apple.co/31nFiU1 [https://perma.cc/R7AZ-BVTV].
71. See Swee Kiat Lim, Apple’s NeuralHash—How It Works and How It
Might Be Compromised, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Aug. 20, 2021), https://bit.ly/
3GR7gIj [https://perma.cc/QX2R-QCJZ] (describing Apple’s NeuralHash technology featuring client-side scanning as “new” and possessing both capabilities and
vulnerabilities that are unique relative to server-side anti-CSAM hashing technologies utilized by Bing, Google, Facebook, etc.); see also EDUCATED GUESSWORK,
PERCEPTUAL VERSUS CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHES FOR CSAM SCANNING (Aug. 24,
2021), https://bit.ly/2YctH98 [https://perma.cc/LX9M-X4XK] (contrasting Apple’s
NeuralHash technology with other technology companies’ use of the competing
algorithm PhotoDNA and discussing the exposure risk inherent in NeuralHash’s
client-based algorithm because users will have access to the algorithm on their
devices).
72. See Hollister, supra note 8 (providing via exchange Number 71 an
iMessage conversation where Apple’s anti-fraud chief Eric Friedman states that
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“we [Apple] are the greatest platform for distributing child porn.”73
Friedman attributed this failure to Apple’s focus on privacy, an area
in which he alleged Apple’s rivals underperformed.74
2. The Backlash and Apple’s Response
Privacy, the concept that Apple repeatedly touted as its greatest strength in marketing campaigns, was on the minds of Apple’s
critics, who strongly contested Apple’s plan to implement cryptographic tools requiring the installation of hashes onto every Apple
device.75 One critic decried Apple’s move as the installation of a
“back door” that would enable nefarious actors to prey on users’
personally identifiable information and present an opportunity for
authoritarian governments to spy on dissidents’ communications.76
Edward Snowden declared that Apple’s anti-CSAM tools represented “mass surveillance” and turned users’ iPhones into
“iNarcs.”77
Apple responded to the controversy by announcing that it
would delay by “months” the implementation of its anti-CSAM
hashing protocol.78 Despite its willingness to postpone installing its
hashing protocol on devices, there is no indication that Apple will
not fully implement it.79
E. Fourth Amendment Implications
Apple’s new cryptographic tools may implicate the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, in relevant part, provides,
“[t]he right of the people, to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
Apple has deliberately avoided acknowledging the CSAM problem on its platform
and when Apple does acknowledge it, Apple underreports the problem).
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See Leswing, supra note 7 (reporting Apple’s privacy push since 2014); see
also Jeff Parrott, Apple Says It Will Scan iPhones for Images of Child Abuse, But Is
That a Breach of Privacy?, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 6, 2021, 1:22 PM), https://bit.ly/
3xGfsqD [https://perma.cc/T7SW-RGBZ]; Edward Snowden (@Snowden), TWITTER (Aug. 5, 2021, 10:23 PM), https://bit.ly/3EdRntE [https://perma.cc/DG7636MQ]; India McKinney & Erica Portnoy, Apple’s Plan to “Think Different”
About Encryption Opens a Backdoor to Your Private Life, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Aug. 5, 2021), https://bit.ly/32PGmkt [https://perma.cc/W8UG-QXM5].
76. McKinney & Portnoy, supra note 75.
77. Snowden, supra note 75.
78. APPLE, supra note 68 (updating the original page on September 3, 2021 to
include a comment announcing the delay).
79. Id. (describing the delay as one undertaken to improve the product
“before releasing” it); Porter, supra note 9.
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not be violated.”80 By a plain reading of the Fourth Amendment, it
may appear that running searches on one’s device without permission could be construed as an unreasonable search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. However, a rich history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides several considerations when evaluating Apple’s move, including the development of the private search
doctrine and contemporary Fourth Amendment decisions involving
CSAM, NCMEC, and technology companies.81
1. Pre-Private Search Doctrine
In the early years of the communication revolution sparked by
the adoption of the telephone in the United States, the Supreme
Court took a dim view of criminal defendants’ Fourth Amendmentbased objections to government wiretapping.82 In the Supreme
Court case of Olmstead v. United States,83 the majority reasoned
that a warrantless government wiretap of a defendant was legal because there was “no searching” and “no seizure.”84 In seeing wiretapping as intangible evidence secured only by “hearing,” the Court
appeared to connect wiretapping to the common law’s conception
of eavesdropping, which was considered a mere nuisance.85 Under
an Olmstead view of the Fourth Amendment, one’s intangible effects are not entitled to the same protection as one’s tangible
effects.86
In a case that would set the stage for later private search doctrine disputes, the Supreme Court held in Burdeau v. McDowell87
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect an individual from a
private party stealing one’s effects and then handing them over to
the government.88 In a sense, evidence that would have been illegal
for the government to obtain in such a manner is “cleansed” by a
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION
PRIVACY LAW 270–361 (7th ed. 2021) (discussing at length the development of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the private search doctrine).
82. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (stating that one
who installs and uses a telephone in his house, intending to transmit his voice
outside of his home, loses Fourth Amendment protections for any message transmitted with this telephone).
83. 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
84. Id. at 464.
85. Id.; see also SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 277 (detailing the
understanding of eavesdropping at common law).
86. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 282 (concluding that Olmstead led to a view that Fourth Amendment protections are only available to defendants who suffer a physical trespass).
87. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
88. See id. at 475–76.
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private party’s first obtaining the evidence, even if the private party
steals property.89 The Court’s reasoning relied on a literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as proscribing only government
action.90 The Burdeau Court’s holding raises an ethical issue: if the
government is forbidden from acting, but a private party is not forbidden from acting on behalf of the government, is there not an
incentive for the government to deputize the private party to circumvent the law on its behalf?91
In Lopez v. United States,92 Justice Warren provided the first
warning that the Supreme Court could conceivably go too far in
limiting the reach of the Fourth Amendment, writing that “advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a great
danger to the privacy of the individual.”93 However, Lopez continued the trend of placing limits on Fourth Amendment protections
by establishing that the government does not violate the Fourth
Amendment when it warrantlessly records a conversation between
a police informant and a suspect.94
Reversing the trend of pro-government decisions, in Katz v.
United States,95 the Supreme Court held that “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”96 Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz was noteworthy because it provided a
two-part test to establish whether Fourth Amendment protections
apply.97 First, a person must exhibit an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, that expectation must be reasonable.98
This test would later become known as the “reasonable expectation
of privacy test.”99
After setting limits on the government’s ability to engage in
warrantless searches, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
89. See id.; see also United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 967–68 (9th Cir.
2021) (detailing at length the impact of Burdeau on Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).
90. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment was
intended only as a restraint on sovereign authority).
91. See id. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (allowing for the constitutionality
of the majority’s opinion while protesting its result as violating the rule of law and
common decency).
92. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
93. Id. at 441 (Warren, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 438–39 (majority opinion) (extending the holding in Olmstead by
relying on a physical interpretation of Fourth Amendment protections).
95. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
96. Id. at 357.
97. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 292.
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Fourth Amendment should not restrict private parties from voluntarily reporting crimes to the police.100 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,101 the Court held that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated when his wife, under her own volition, provided police with evidence implicating him in a murder.102 The
Court’s relevant inquiry was whether, in providing evidence to the
police, the private party acted under government compulsion.103
When presented with incriminating evidence freely given to them
by a cooperating witness, police should not be required to “avert
their eyes.”104
The Supreme Court extended Coolidge further in United States
v. Miller,105 in which the government’s conduct in directing a bank
to maintain and report customer records to the government was
held constitutional.106 Despite the government’s effective deputization of a private party for law enforcement purposes, the majority
did not see any Fourth Amendment implication in the government’s conduct.107 The Court reasoned that the government’s intrusion into private records was constitutional because the search did
not intrude on a “zone of privacy” involving a person or property in
a constitutionally protected area.108
2. The Private Search Doctrine
The private search doctrine plays a significant role in nearly
every CSAM-related Fourth Amendment case.109 This doctrine permits the government to obtain evidence under circumstances that
would otherwise require a warrant.110 When a private party first
100. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489 (1971).
101. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
102. Id. at 486.
103. Id. at 489.
104. Id.
105. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
106. Id. at 440.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 967–68, 976–79 (9th Cir. 2021)
(detailing the evolution of the private search doctrine and other appellate courts’
interpretations of the doctrine). The third party doctrine is a related but separate
legal doctrine that has yet to emerge as a significant factor in CSAM-related
Fourth Amendment cases. Id. The third party doctrine allows the government to
use information obtained by third parties, even information obtained in confidence, in a criminal prosecution without violating the Fourth Amendment. Miller,
403 U.S. at 443. United States v. Ackerman hinted at the possibility of the third
party doctrine coming into play in a later CSAM-related Fourth Amendment case;
however, that moment has not yet arisen. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d
1292, 1308 (10th Cir. 2016).
110. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1980).
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conducts its own search, and the government then repeats the private search without exceeding its parameters, the government
search does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.111 This doctrine
was first glimpsed in Coolidge, and its contours were refined in two
subsequent cases.112 Walter v. United States113 occupies one end of
the spectrum of the private search doctrine, with United States v.
Jacobsen114 occupying the other end.115
In Walter, private actors handed unwatched film reels to government agents, describing them as contraband.116 The Court held
that when government agents watched the films without obtaining a
search warrant, they performed an unconstitutional search under
the Fourth Amendment because the government exceeded the
scope of the private search that preceded it.117 Had the private actors first watched the films before handing them over, the government presumably would not have violated the private search
doctrine.118
In contrast, the Court held in Jacobsen that the government
did not perform a “search” under the Fourth Amendment because
it did not exceed the scope of the private search that preceded it.119
Jacobsen involved federal agents opening a package previously
opened by FedEx employees and testing the contents for cocaine.120
The Jacobsen Court reasoned that the federal agents’ invasions of
the defendant’s privacy must be tested by the extent to which they
exceeded the scope of the FedEx employees’ search.121 FedEx employees frustrated the defendant’s expectation of privacy by opening a damaged package and reporting its contents to the
government, and federal agents learned nothing more than what
the private search had discovered.122
111. Id.
112. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487–90 (1971); Walter,
447 U.S. at 656–57; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114–15 (1984).
113. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
114. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
115. Walter found the government’s conduct unconstitutional while Jacobsen
reached the opposite conclusion. Walter, 447 U.S. at 656–57; Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at
115.
116. Walter, 447 U.S. at 651.
117. Id. at 657.
118. See id. at 657–58.
119. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115–16.
120. Id. at 111–12.
121. Id. at 115–16.
122. Id. at 120.
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a. Other Relevant Cases to the Private Search Doctrine
Subjecting luggage to a sniff test by a trained narcotics dog is
not a search under the Fourth Amendment because the search can
only reveal the existence of contraband, not any form of private
information.123 Thus, binary searches that can only reveal the existence of contraband are acceptable under the Fourth Amendment.124 In allowing for such “binary searches,” the Supreme Court
further limited the extent of Fourth Amendment protections.
In contrast to the binary search decision, the Supreme Court
restricted the reach of the private search doctrine when it held that
merely because the government does not compel a private search
does not prove that the search in question is private.125 When a
private railroad company mandated breath and urine tests for its
employees in response to regulations issued by a federal agency, the
Court held those tests were searches under the Fourth Amendment.126 In this sense, private actors may be unlawfully deputized
by the government even without direct orders in situations where
they are sufficiently nudged into performing the government’s desired search.127
3. CSAM-Related Fourth Amendment Cases
United States v. Ackerman,128 a Tenth Circuit decision authored
by future Supreme Court Justice GORSUCH, set limits on the private
search doctrine by ruling against the anti-CSAM union of government, NCMEC, and technology companies.129 Ackerman held that
NCMEC was a government entity for Fourth Amendment purposes
because it was statutorily obliged to act as a national clearinghouse
for CSAM reports, and in this role, its search of a defendant’s email
was unlawful because it did not seek a warrant.130 NCMEC’s search
was unlawful because it either (1) conducted an impermissible warrantless search as a government entity or, (2) acting as the govern123. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
124. Id.
125. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989).
126. Id. at 614.
127. See id. at 615–16. The Court did find that the tests were reasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment, but the Court’s acknowledgement that the
Fourth Amendment was implicated implies that there must be a situation in which
such a search would be unreasonable. See id.
128. 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
129. Id. at 1295.
130. Id. at 1296.
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ment’s agent, exceeded the scope of the internet service provider
(ISP)’s search that preceded it.131
NCMEC exceeded the search of the ISP before it because the
ISP identified suspect images using only its hashing algorithm and
forwarded the images to NCMEC without inspecting them.132 Once
NCMEC received the images, its agents inspected the images and
identified them as CSAM.133 Thus, NCMEC’s search exceeded the
scope of the search that preceded it because the images were not
previously inspected.134
The First Circuit applied Ackerman to reach a different conclusion in United States v. Powell135 when it held that NCMEC’s warrantless viewing of screenshots taken by a chat website was lawful
because NCMEC did not exceed the scope of the chat website’s
search.136 The chat website, Omegle, opened and viewed the suspect screenshots before forwarding them to NCMEC.137 In so doing, NCMEC could not violate the private search doctrine because
its viewing of the defendant’s screenshots simply repeated the same
search Omegle performed.138
The Fifth Circuit strengthened the government’s search power
in United States v. Reddick139 when it held that the critical inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment is whether authorities obtained information to which the defendant’s expectation of privacy had not
already been frustrated.140 The court further held that police did
not violate a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by reviewing
images the defendant uploaded to a cloud hosting service because
the defendant’s expectation of privacy was frustrated by the private
search.141 The Fifth Circuit’s approach thus obviates the need for
the ISP to conduct its own inspection of the suspect images to satisfy the private search doctrine.142 Instead, simply by running a hash
algorithm to identify suspect images and forwarding those images
131. Id. at 1295–99, 1300–03.
132. Id. at 1305–06.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 925 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2018).
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 3–4.
138. Id.
139. 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018).
140. Id. at 638.
141. Id. at 639.
142. Reddick’s interpretation of the private search doctrine is more expansive
than the Tenth and First Circuits because the Fifth Circuit held that hash value
matching is so precise that there was no need for the ISP agent to personally inspect the files prior to sending them to law enforcement. See id. In this way, Reddick may be seen as expanding the reach of Jacobsen, where agents repeated a
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to law enforcement, the technology company has already frustrated
the image owner’s expectation of privacy, and any further searches
by law enforcement are valid.143
Despite appearing to veer from the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the private search doctrine, the Fifth Circuit still tried to
keep its holding in line with Ackerman.144 The majority in Reddick
reasoned that their conclusion was distinguishable from Ackerman
because, in Ackerman, the detective opened email attachments that
had never been previously inspected (either by the algorithm or a
human agent), whereas, in Reddick, the detective only opened files
previously inspected by the algorithm.145
The Sixth Circuit followed the First and Fifth Circuits in holding against a defendant in a Fourth Amendment CSAM-related
case.146 United States v. Miller147 held that a defendant’s claim that a
police detective violated the private search doctrine failed because
when there is a “virtual certainty” that the government’s search will
disclose nothing more than what a private party’s earlier search has
revealed, no Fourth Amendment search occurs.148 The Miller court
reasoned that Google’s hash-value algorithm’s “near-perfect accuracy” meant that the detective’s search was unlikely to sweep up
any private information beyond what Google had already identified
and inspected.149
The Seventh Circuit created a new opening for technology
companies seeking to restrict CSAM on their platforms in United
States v. Bebris.150 In Bebris, the court held that Facebook did not
act as a government agent when it reviewed messages on its servers
for CSAM and then reported that information to NCMEC.151 In
addition, the court described an “independent business purpose” as
an acceptable justification for a technology company to move to
eradicate CSAM on its platform.152 When a company acts with “independent business purpose” and its actions comport with governphysical search by private actors and did not merely rely on the private actors’
report. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118–19 (1984).
143. See Reddick, 900 F.3d at 639.
144. See id. at 639–40.
145. Id.
146. United States v. Miller, 982 F.3d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 2020).
147. 982 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2020).
148. Id. at 417–18.
149. Id. at 418.
150. See United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2021). The “new
opening” refers to the Court’s discussion of a technology company’s “independent
business purpose.” See id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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ment intentions, the company merely acts with mutual purpose and
not out of compulsion.153 Under these circumstances, a company’s
actions do not implicate the private search doctrine or the Fourth
Amendment.154
Finally, the Ninth Circuit interrupted the trend of pro-government decisions when it held in United States v. Wilson155 that the
government’s actions exceeded the limits of the private search doctrine.156 In Wilson, the court held that the government learned new,
critical information not revealed by a previous private search when
it viewed attachments that no Google employee had previously
viewed.157 In addition, Google’s algorithm merely labeled the
images “A1” and provided no description before sending them to
the government.158 Therefore, when the government opened the
images, it was not accessing information consistent with Google’s
report, rather it was accessing new information.159 Lastly, even if
Google employees had viewed the images used by its algorithm, the
defendant’s expectation of privacy in his own images would not
have been frustrated.160 The defendant’s expectation of privacy
would not have been frustrated by Google’s search because Google
employees did not view his images, but instead viewed other images
identified as CSAM.161 Google’s hash-value algorithm then reported the defendant’s images as exact copies of the previously
identified CSAM images.162 Thus, no inspection of the defendant’s
images took place, and his expectation of privacy was not
frustrated.163
In reaching its decision, the Wilson court emphasized the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights.164 The court likened
Google and the government’s actions to one in which the police
search a person’s house and discover contraband along with a note
specifying that another person has exact copies of that contra153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 13 F.4th 961 (9th Cir. 2021).
156. Id. at 974–75.
157. Id. at 974.
158. Id. (describing the “A1” designation as resulting from Google’s proprietary technology and providing no further description of what the “A1” designation
meant).
159. Id.
160. Wilson, 13 F.4th at 974–75.
161. Id. at 975.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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band.165 Without a warrant, the police may not use that note as a
pretext to then search the other person’s house and seize the
contraband.166
The Ninth Circuit described a “growing tension in the circuits”
surrounding application of the private search doctrine in CSAM
cases.167 The Wilson court found common cause with the Ackerman
court, finding the Tenth Circuit’s analysis “consistent” with the
Ninth Circuit’s.168 However, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, in Reddick
and Miller, reached different conclusions.169
The Ninth Circuit’s decision was consistent with private search
doctrine cases not related to hash value matching, such as the Sixth
Circuit’s United States v. Lichtenberger,170 a case in which a defendant’s girlfriend showed police a computer she said contained
CSAM.171 The girlfriend, however, could not remember if the pictures she showed to the police were the same as the ones she had
viewed earlier.172 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held that the scope of
the government search exceeded that of the private search that preceded it.173 Similarly, in the Eleventh Circuit case of United States v.
Sparks,174 a store employee and her fiancé discovered a phone containing CSAM and showed the phone to police.175 The police officer then viewed two videos containing CSAM, but the private
parties had not viewed one of the videos.176 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the government’s search was barred by the private
search doctrine because the scope of the government search exceeded the private search that preceded it.177
4. Carpenter v. United States
The Supreme Court’s most recent opinion addressing the intersection of technology and the Fourth Amendment came in 2018,
165. Wilson, 13 F.4th at 975.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 976.
168. Id. at 977.
169. Id. at 978.
170. 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015).
171. Wilson, 13 F.4th at 977; United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 480
(6th Cir. 2015).
172. Lichtenberger, 768 F.3d at 481.
173. Id. at 485.
174. 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).
175. Id. at 1329 (overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ross, 963
F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2020)).
176. Id. at 1335.
177. Id.
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when Carpenter v. United States178 addressed government searches
in the context of cell phone data.179 Carpenter held that a defendant’s cell-site location information (“CSLI”), the information that
results when a cell phone pings a cell tower, is protected by the
Fourth Amendment.180 Unlike its earlier ruling in Miller, when the
Court approved of a bank providing a defendant’s records to the
government, the Court did not approve of a cell phone company
releasing its records to the government because it was concerned
with the “inescapable and automatic,” as well as “deeply revealing”
nature of the CSLI.181 The Court also held that generally, police
must obtain a warrant before searching a person’s phone because
modern phones contain an “immense storage capacity.”182
Carpenter represents the Supreme Court’s desire to prevent
further erosion of Fourth Amendment protections to technological
development.183 In addition, four Supreme Court justices filed dissents, indicating that Fourth Amendment interpretation has yet to
reach a firm consensus on the Supreme Court.184
II.

ANALYSIS

A. Apple’s Move Is Constitutional
Despite the controversy Apple’s announcement provoked and
the well-intentioned criticism the company received, Apple’s antiCSAM hashing technology is carefully crafted to survive Fourth
Amendment scrutiny.185 Thus, a Fourth Amendment legal challenge to Apple’s move will likely fail. Apple’s move is constitutional because Apple: (1) has an independent business purpose to
search its users’ phones, (2) satisfies all private search doctrine concerns addressed by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and (3) aligns itself with the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits’ holdings in favor of
178. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
179. Id. at 2208–09.
180. Id.
181. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at
2222–23.
182. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
183. Id. at 2222 (“When confronting new concerns wrought by digital technology, this Court has been careful not to uncritically extend existing precedents.”).
184. Id. at 2223–35 (Kennedy, THOMAS, & ALITO, JJ., dissenting); id. at
2235–46 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); id. at 2246–61 (ALITO & THOMAS, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2261–72 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting).
185. See APPLE, supra note 10, at 4–6 (revealing that Apple’s plan requires
human review and protects user privacy).
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technology companies.186 Finally, any judicial rejection of Apple’s
move would violate public policy.187
1. Apple Is Not Acting as a Government Agent When It Scans Its
Users’ Devices Because It Has an Independent Business
Purpose to Conduct the Search
To avoid implicating the Fourth Amendment, Apple should
first establish that it is not a government agent because it is installing its anti-CSAM hashing algorithm for an independent business
purpose and not out of government compulsion.188 By establishing
this “independent business purpose,” Apple can then justify its intrusion into its users’ devices.189
A company may establish an independent business purpose to
regulate CSAM on its platform in several ways. First, it may point
to the direct and indirect costs associated with CSAM activity on its
platform.190 These costs include the time the company must spend
dealing with customer complaints and organized customer action
for failure to deal with CSAM.191 Companies may also face image
and reputational harms when they fail to confront CSAM
appropriately.192
Second, a company may show that no federal law requires it to
search for CSAM on its platform.193 Although service providers are
required to report CSAM to NCMEC upon discovery, any action
186. See id.
187. See 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b) (providing for an annual grant of federal funds
to NCMEC to operate reporting services for CSAM and other activities); see also
18 U.S.C. § 2258A (providing that service providers have a duty to report CSAM
on their platforms to NCMEC). The public policy favoring public-private partnerships against CSAM may also be evidenced by 18 U.S.C. § 2258B, which provides
immunity for providers and their officers for actions arising out of their reporting
responsibilities under 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
188. See United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2021) (discussing the importance of a private company’s “independent business purpose” in establishing that the company did not act out of government coercion).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.; see also Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellee, United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551 (2021) (No. 20-3291), 2021 WL
955054, at *10–11 (describing Facebook’s decision to confront CSAM as one motivated by a desire to be a “good corporate citizen” and because the company believes child pornography “abhorrent”).
192. See Bebris, 4 F.4th at 561; see also Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellee, United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551 (2021) (No. 203291), 2021 WL 955054, at *10 (supporting statement that no business that valued
its image and reputation would desire to be publicly associated with child sexual
exploitation).
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (stating that service providers have a duty to report CSAM they discover on their platforms to NCMEC, but no duty to search);
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taken to search for CSAM is based only on the discretion of the
provider.194
Finally, a company may demonstrate that working toward a
common purpose with government does not make the company
into the government’s agent.195 Instead, public-private partnerships
emerging out of a joint desire to improve society represent a public
policy that courts should acknowledge.196
First, Apple is not acting as a government agent when it installs
its hashing algorithm on Apple devices because it has an independent business purpose for doing so. Many critics have subjected Apple to criticism for its failure to confront CSAM on its platform.197
The direct costs of this failure include the reputational damage Apple has suffered for becoming “the greatest platform for distributing child porn.”198 Reputational damage can damage a
corporation’s profits, its main reason for existence.199
Apple’s failure to confront CSAM has also incurred indirect
costs. Because Apple’s smartphone market share is so large, the effect of Apple devices becoming a haven for CSAM can presumably
have society-wide effects.200 A society that permits child abuse on a
vast scale is likely a less productive and efficient society.201 Less
productive and efficient societies will undoubtedly lack the human
see also United States v. Ringland, 966 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Section
2258A does not require ESPs to seek out and discover violations.”).
194. See Ringland, 966 F.3d at 736.
195. See United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 1988) (providing
that “mere knowledge of another’s independent action” does not constitute government acquiescence “absent some manifestation of consent and the ability to
control”).
196. The public policy favoring public-private partnerships against CSAM
may also be evidenced by 18 U.S.C. § 2258B which provides immunity for providers and their officers for actions arising out of their reporting responsibilities under
18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
197. See Matt Burgess, How Apple Can Fix Its Child Sexual Abuse Problem,
WIRED (Sept. 8, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3pJdxyB [https://perma.cc/S9JV28SG] (reporting that Apple faced an inquiry into child sexual abuse from the
U.K. government and legislation from the European Commission mandating that
technology companies scan for CSAM, and quoting a cybersecurity expert who
described Apple’s move as “long overdue”).
198. Hollister, supra note 72.
199. See, e.g., Michael Volkov, Calculating the Incalculable: Reputational
Damage, VOLKOV L. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2015), https://bit.ly/3Gav87Z [https://
perma.cc/JU3M-EDPL] (describing, for example, the reputational damage Subway
suffered on discovery of spokesman Jared Fogle’s acts of child sexual exploitation).
200. See STATISTA, supra note 54.
201. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COST OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT RIVAL OTHER MAJOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEMS (2014),
https://bit.ly/3rVXqOF [https://perma.cc/D7QG-9LNW] (reporting the financial
cost of confirmed cases of child maltreatment as $124 billion per year).
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capital necessary to sustain or increase demand for more Apple
products and services.202 Any CSAM permitted on Apple’s devices
negatively affects society as a whole, and in turn, Apple itself.
Second, Apple is not acting as a government agent because the
government does not require Apple to search for CSAM on its platform.203 Not only is there no law compelling Apple to act but the
government has taken no overt steps to force Apple to act.204 Instead, Apple is responding to private criticism and acting on its own
concerns to clean up its platform.205
Finally, Apple is not acting as a government agent merely because the government shares a desire to combat CSAM.206 When it
searches its customers’ devices without the government’s prompting, Apple will act out of its own private business interest and not
under government compulsion.207
2. Apple’s New Tools Satisfy All Private Search Doctrine
Concerns Raised by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
Apple’s new tools were carefully crafted to satisfy the private
search doctrine concerns of the Ackerman court and the Wilson
court.208 Ackerman held that NCMEC exceeded the private search
that preceded it because no human reviewed the selected images
prior to NCMEC.209 Wilson held that the private search doctrine
was violated in three ways.210 First, only an algorithm, and not a
202. See id. One may infer that child abuse on a society-wide level affects
Apple’s bottom line based on the previously cited cost of $124 billion per year and
the fact that Apple depends largely on the health of the American economy to
succeed. See id.; see also Lionel Sujay Vailshery, Revenue of Apple by Geographical Region from the First Quarter of 2012 to 4th Quarter 2021, STATISTA (Nov. 23,
2021), https://bit.ly/3o7fhAU [https://perma.cc/58SJ-NKCZ] (reporting that despite
a growing international sales volume, the United States. still accounts for 40 percent of Apple’s net sales).
203. See 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
204. See id.; see also APPLE, supra note 10, at 6 (stating that, in the past, Apple has faced pressure from governments to degrade user privacy but has always
resisted such demands).
205. See APPLE, supra note 10, at 6.
206. See United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 1988) (providing
that “mere knowledge of another’s independent action” does not constitute government acquiescence “absent some manifestation of consent and the ability to
control”).
207. See United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that even with the government’s knowledge and acquiescence to a private search,
the private party still did not act under compulsion of government and the search
did not implicate the Fourth Amendment).
208. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1292 (10th Cir. 2016); see
also United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2021).
209. See Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1305–06.
210. Wilson, 13 F.4th at 973–75.
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human, reviewed the defendant’s images at Google before they
were sent to NCMEC.211 Second, Google’s process only allowed for
employees to view stock CSAM images used by the algorithm, and
not the suspect images used by defendant Wilson himself.212 Third,
the offending images were poorly marked by the algorithm and
failed to provide an adequate explanation for the image’s
contents.213
Satisfying both Ackerman and the first point identified by Wilson, Apple will share no photo and no potentially incriminating information with NCMEC without human review.214 Addressing
Wilson’s second point, this human review will require an Apple employee to review the suspect images, and not merely the images
used by the algorithm for matching purposes.215 To meet Wilson’s
third concern, Apple will fully describe the contents of the suspect
photos to allow for proper verification by NCMEC employees.216
By completing all these steps, Apple will fully satisfy the standard
of the private search doctrine.217 Those NCMEC or government
employees who follow up on Apple’s reports will be unable to expand the scope of the private search.218 In addition, Apple will frustrate the defendant’s expectation of privacy, meeting the standard
identified by the Wilson court.219
3. Apple’s Move Aligns with First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit
Holdings Supporting Technology Companies Because Its
Anti-CSAM Procedures Include Safeguards Beyond
Those Used in These Cases
The First Circuit in Powell held that NCMEC did not violate
the private search doctrine because it repeated the exact search that
the chat website Omegle conducted previously.220 Likewise, Apple’s technology and anti-CSAM investigation, including
211. Id. at 973–74.
212. Id. at 975.
213. Id. at 974.
214. APPLE, supra note 10, at 5.
215. Id.
216. See id. (detailing that Apple will only report images known as suspected
CSAM because they exist in NCMEC’s database of verified CSAM images).
217. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1980); see also United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115–17 (1984).
218. See APPLE, supra note 10, at 5–6. Assuming that Apple’s procedures are
followed correctly, there will be no opportunity for NCMEC to violate the private
search doctrine because there will be no unexposed information left for NCMEC
to expose. See id.
219. See id.; see also Walter, 447 U.S. at 656–57; United States v. Reddick, 900
F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 2018).
220. United States v. Powell, 925 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2018).
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mandatory human review of all suspect images, will not allow for a
situation in which NCMEC might violate the private search
doctrine.221
In Reddick, the Fifth Circuit held that a government agent inspecting suspect images did not violate the private search doctrine
even though the private search was conducted only by algorithm.222
Here, Apple’s process goes beyond the Fifth Circuit’s holding by
ensuring that human review of all suspect images identified by the
algorithm will occur prior to sending a report.223
In a similar holding to Reddick, the Sixth Circuit held in Miller
that Google’s hash-value algorithm was so close to perfect that
human review was unnecessary.224 Again, Apple exceeds this standard because not only is it using the best available hashing technology to find images, but it is also including human review once those
images are identified.225
4. Any Judicial Rejection of Apple’s Move Violates Public Policy
Given the strong public policy favoring the eradication of
CSAM, any judicial rejection of Apple’s move would violate public
policy.226 The U.S. Congress expressed this policy when it enacted
statutes providing for federal funding of NCMEC and mandating
the reporting of any CSAM providers discovered.227 In addition,
Congress has enacted numerous other statutes emphasizing a desire
to protect victims of child sexual abuse and to punish those responsible for child sexual abuse and CSAM.228 Executive Branch agen221. See APPLE, supra note 10, at 5–6 (assuming that Apple’s protocol is
followed).
222. Reddick, 900 F.3d at 639.
223. See APPLE, supra note 10, at 5–6.
224. United States v. Miller, 982 F.3d 412, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2020).
225. See APPLE, CSAM DETECTION: TECHNICAL SUMMARY 4 (2021), https://
apple.co/31nFiU1 [https://perma.cc/WBM7-UBFV] (describing NeuralHash, Apple’s hashing technology). There is only a one-in-one-trillion chance that Apple’s
hashing technology will identify an incorrect account. Id.
226. Public Policy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “Public policy” is the collective rules, principles, or approaches to problems that affect the
commonwealth or (esp.) promote the general good; specif., principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental concern
to the state and the whole of society. Id.
227. See 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
228. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2259B (providing a reserve fund for victims of
child pornography); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (providing criminal penalties for production or possession of CSAM); 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (providing for mandatory restitution to victims of CSAM trafficking).
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cies have also expressed this anti-CSAM policy through several
administrations.229
Apple’s move strongly comports with the will of Congress because it will significantly reduce the production and transmission of
CSAM.230 Thus, any judicial act that disrupts Apple’s move will violate public policy as expressed by the American people’s elected
representatives.
B. The Supreme Court Should Adopt a Synthesized Rule
To resolve the circuit split regarding CSAM-related Fourth
Amendment cases, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a
related case.231 Then, the Court should adopt a rule that resolves
the concerns identified by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits with the
holdings of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.232 This rule
would permit technology companies to use hashing to identify
CSAM on their platforms and refer those responsible to law enforcement, but only with certain constitutional safeguards in place.
One such possible rule would be: Technology companies with
an independent business purpose that search for CSAM on their
platforms and forward the results of their findings to NCMEC or
the government do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, provided
that the search conducted by NCMEC or the government survives
an analysis under the private search doctrine.233 In addition, the following clarifying instruction should be included: NCMEC is not acting as a government agent when it conducts a search of suspected
CSAM it received from a technology company, provided that
229. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 21; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
supra note 24; FBI Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2020: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Just., Sci. & Related Agencies of the H. Appropriations Comm.,
116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation), https://bit.ly/3pwKbUV [https://perma.cc/QXZ9-3WNA].
230. Because Apple controls such a large share of the smartphone market and
because it has failed to report significant CSAM, it may be inferred that, when
implemented, Apple’s initiative will significantly reduce the quantity of available
CSAM. See NCMEC REPORTS, supra note 41; see also STATISTA, SUBSCRIBER
SHARE HELD BY SMARTPHONE OPERATING SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM 2012 TO 2021 (2021), https://bit.ly/3ptpR6L [https://perma.cc/4WC2-Y78R].
231. See United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2021) (describing
a “growing tension in the circuits” over CSAM-related Fourth Amendment interpretation); see also Sup. Ct. Rule 10(a) (specifying that one of the standards for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari is when U.S. courts of appeals are in conflict on
the same “important matter”).
232. See Wilson, 13 F.4th at 976–78 (summarizing the differences between the
U.S. courts of appeals on this Comment’s topic).
233. See United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2021) (discussing the importance of a private company’s “independent business purpose” in establishing that the company did not act out of government coercion).
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NCMEC does not violate the private search doctrine.234 Finally, the
Court should acknowledge the public policy that supports the eradication of CSAM: Public policy strongly favors techniques, procedures, and technologies that seek to eradicate or disrupt the
production and dissemination of CSAM.235
The advantage of such a rule is that it would offer clarity to the
circuit courts as they apply established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to modern, technology-related legal problems. Requiring
technology companies to act with an independent business purpose
would protect defendants who can show that the technology company acted out of government coercion.236 In addition, it is important to clarify NCMEC’s role in the process.237 The Supreme Court
should recognize NCMEC’s important, congressionally supported,
role in bringing to justice those who violate CSAM laws.238 The
Court may do so while still respecting criminal defendants’ Fourth
Amendment rights by simply requiring that all actors abide by the
private search doctrine.239 Finally, the Court’s acknowledgement of
the public policy against CSAM will indicate to lower courts that
any legal analysis of CSAM cases must recognize the importance of
this public policy.

234. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2016) (addressing the Tenth Circuit’s holding that NCMEC was acting as a governmental
entity).
235. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2259B (providing a reserve fund for victims of
child pornography); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (providing criminal penalties for production or possession of CSAM); 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (providing for mandatory restitution to victims of CSAM trafficking); 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b); 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
236. Admittedly, it may be difficult for a criminal defendant to credibly argue
that a large technology company such as Apple does not have an independent
business purpose in eradicating CSAM on its platform. See Brief for Facebook,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551
(2021) (No. 20-3291), 2021 WL 955054, at *10 (supporting statement that no business that valued its image and reputation would desire to be publicly associated
with child sexual exploitation). The public desire for companies to combat CSAM
and the reputational damage a company may suffer from allowing their platforms
to be infested with CSAM provides a strong basis for private, independent antiCSAM action. Id. However, this rule would still provide a defense for criminal
defendants should the government become overly involved in prompting private
action. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1980) (holding the government’s search unconstitutional as violating the private search doctrine).
237. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2016) (addressing the Tenth Circuit’s holding that NCMEC was acting as a governmental
entity).
238. See 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
239. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1980) (holding the
government’s search unconstitutional as violating the private search doctrine).
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CONCLUSION
Whoever receives one such child in my name receives me, but
whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin,
it would be better for him to have a great millstone fastened
around his neck and to be drowned in the depth of the sea.240

A society that does not protect its children will not long endure. The U.S. legal system must find an accommodation between
the need to protect children from horrific abuse and the need to
protect citizens’ constitutional rights. With an appropriately structured legal rule, neither of these principles will be sacrificed.
Citizens will not suffer an erosion of their Fourth Amendment
rights should courts continue to safeguard the private search doctrine in CSAM cases.241 Similarly, children will be adequately protected should courts guarantee criminal defendants their rights
against unreasonable search and seizure.242
Apple may scan its users’ devices for CSAM without violating
the Fourth Amendment.243 Once Apple discovers CSAM, and after
human review, Apple is then legally required to refer that information to NCMEC.244 After NCMEC review, law enforcement may
then charge individuals implicated in these CSAM reports from
Apple.245 Assuming that Apple, NCMEC, and law enforcement follow all procedures as planned and directed, criminal defendants are
unlikely to succeed in a Fourth Amendment legal challenge against
Apple, NCMEC, or law enforcement.246

240. Matthew 18:2–6 (English Standard).
241. See generally SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 81 (discussing at length
the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the protections of the
private search doctrine).
242. See Joseph Zabel, Public Surveillance Through Private Eyes: The Case of
the Earn It Act and the Fourth Amendment, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 167, 173
(2020) (describing how, in drafting the Earn It Act, legislators walk a fine line
between the government’s deputizing tech companies and failing to provide any
meaningful incentives to influence tech companies to disrupt CSAM).
243. See APPLE, supra note 10, at 5–6 (assuming Apple’s procedures are
followed).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
246. See APPLE, supra note 10, at 5–6.

